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THE KUWAIT TASK FORCE: A UNIQUE SOLUTION TO
KUWAIVS RECONSTRUCflON PROBLEMS
by Patrick W. Canton, Colonel, USAR (Ret.)
‘The role that was played by Civil Affairs . . . needs to be explained
and better understood by the American people. This includes the manner in
which pbinning was accomplished for Kuwait reconstitution.”
Civil Affairs forces have been pan of the Army inventoiy since World War II, where
they served well and faithfully, usually performing the doctrinal mission of civil
adminictradon in occupied Europe and in Japan. Since that rime, however, utilization of
the CA capability has languished, being relegated primarily to the U. S. Army Reserve and
seldom allowed to participate in military pre- or post-conflict planning.
During the 1970’s, under the auspices of the CAPSTONE program, relationships were
established between Reserve Component (RC) CA units and a variety of Active Component
(AC) organizations, but these relationships, intended to foster training, mutual
understanding, and increased opportunity for CA utilization, were in some cases only
incompletely implemented by the time Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM was initiated
in August, 1990.
Most important to the Kuwait scenario was the status of the CAPSTONE relationship
between the 352nd Civil Affairs Command, Riverdale, MD, and Headquarters, Central
Commpnd (USCENTCOM). Speaking plainly, the relationship was incompletely developed
and less than totally satisfactory, both from the perspective of CENTCOM staff officers, who
‘John 0. Marsh, Jr. “Remarks by Honorable John 0. Marsh, Jr., Chairman, Restive Forces Policy Board,
Former Secretary of the Army and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Contha.’ In Pathek W. Canton, Ed., Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf Wan Svmpo6ium Proceedina
(Wwchingtoa Government Printing Office, 1992) p.23. Cited hereafter as “Proceedings”
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had reservations about the capabilities of the 352nd, and from the point of view of the
members of the 352nd, who felt that CENTCOM was not utiHing theft resources and talent
in an altogether appropriate manner.2 When DESERT SHIELD commenced, no plans had
been developed for the restoration of Kuwait or for utilization of the 352nd in the effort.
The attack on Kuwait by Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces stunned the world. Most
analysts at the Department of State and within the international diplomatic community had
rejected that idea that one Arab nation would attack another, despite the festering Kuwaiti-
Iraqi dispute over Rumaila oil field production, and Saddam Hussein’s claims that Kuwait
was conspiring with the U. S. and Israel to “sabotage Iraq.” At the May 1990 Arab League
Summit in Baghdad, Saddam sought payment of $27 billion from Kuwait, claiming that the
Kuwaitis had been stealing Iraqi oil. In June he demanded that Kuwait and other Arab
states bordering the Persian Gull cut production in an attempt to drive up the price per
barrel of crude oil? Saddam’s increasingly beffigerant attitude toward Kuwait was
emphasized by ever-larger troop movements of an unusual kind beginning on 17 July 1990.
By the end of the month he had stationed 100,000 troops along the Kuwaiti border.
2 The 352nd, located near Wi.hington, D.C., has long had the reputation of being highly ‘politicized’ in
personnel, attitude, and action. Drawn from the ranks of the government service and those industries dependent
upon the government for theft well-being, the personnel of the 352nd tend to be ‘well-connected’ on Capitol Hill.
Over the past two decades loyal unit members have not hesitated to use these connections on behalf of the
Command. Furthermore, there exists a well-developed and intensely loyal group of ‘alumni’ of the 352nd,
composed of retired officers and enlisted personnel, who have on numerous occasions lobbied vigorously on
behalf of the Command. This situation has not endeared the 352nd to members of the active military
establishment, many of whom have felt the wrath of the CA ‘lobby in matters viewed as detrimental to the
Branch. As an example of the influence exercised by the alumni group, it is well-known within the community
that a dose connection exists between the senior Senator from South Carolina, and the Chairman of the
Executive Committee of the Civil Affairs Assodaton.
William G. Pagonis, Movin2 Mountains (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), p.4.
Kuwait and Iraq had been in constant political conflict since the creation of the former in 1961. A few
days after independence was granted by Great Britain, Iraqi General Qassim claimed Kuwait as Iraqi territory.
The Iraqi threat to Kuwait persisted over the next several decades. Hazzm Beblawi, The Arab Gull Economy
in a Turbulent Me (New York Charles Saibner’s Sons, 1974), p.173.
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On 1 August, the Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander, General H. Norman
SchwanzkopL briefed Secretary’ of Defense Dick Cheney on the likelibood of an Iraqi attack
on Kuwait. Shortly after General Schwartzkopf returned to Tampa, he received word that
the invasion had begun.4
On 8 August 1990, President George bush stated in a speech to the nation that the
U. S. sought” . . . immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces
from Kuwait.. . [and that] . . . Kuwait’s legitimate government must be restored to replace
the puppet regime . This speech triggered immediate Civil Affairs planning efforts
on the pan of the Office of the Assistant Secretary’ of Defense for Special Operations and
Low Intensity Conflict (OASD SO/UC), OSD’s CA proponent.6 By 14 August 1990. the
Hon. Jim Locher ifi, the ASD, had been presented an information paper dealing with
various CA issues. Among these were: DoD’s potential role in the reconstitution of the
government of Kuwait (GOK) and the need to explore with Department of State plans for
support of the GOK; the need to provide cultural orientation for U. S. forces being inserted
into that region and to minimize contacts between Americans and the local populace of
Saudi Arabia, an exceptionally conservative society; and the requirement that U. S. forces
be prepared to help multi-national force commanders lacking CA capabilities in meeting
H. Norman Sthwartzkopf Ti Doesn’t Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), pp. 293-5. General
Schwartzkopf indicated that the CENTCOM intelligence organization was functioning flawlessly, and chat his
information regularly exceeded in quality that being provided by Defense Intelligence Agency, in Washington,
D.C. Cited hereafter as *Hero.
President George Bush,The Defense of Saudi Arabia,’ delivered at the White House, Washington. D.C..
August 8, i990, reprinted in Vital Soeeches of the Day. Vol. LW (September 1, 1990), pp. 674-675. Busbs
statement is followed by that of King Fahd Bin Abdel Añz, of Saudi Arabia.
6 In point of fact, OASD SO/UC has legal responsibility for CA initiatives only insofar as they relate to
special operations. For conventional operations, no proponent at DoD level has been designated. Nevertheless.
given the modest level of attention and support traditionally devoted to CA by the Office of the DepuLy Chief
of Staff for Operations, Department of the Army, it was logical that SO/UC, as a concerned pan, initiate
action. As has so often been said, ‘Power abhors a vacuum’.
Canton, Kuwait Task Force Paper, Page 4
their legal and moral obligations under international law. This paper recommended that
the MD send a memo to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) recommending
activation of the Joint Civil Affairs Committee (JCAC).7 The draft of this memorandum,
staffed informally with the Joint Staff, was ultimately responded to by the Director of the
Joint Staff. (DJS).
The JCAC, chartered to serve as an advisory committee to the Chairman, JCS1 in the
formulation of CA policy, had never been activated. Activation appeared clearly to be in
the best interests of DoD, since the absence of such an instrumentality left the Joint Staff
with inadequate CA policy-development capability. After several days, the DJS indicated
in a handwritten note to the MD that he did not consider activation of the JCAC
appropriate at that time.8 This left the ASD SO/UC to his own devices in surfacing CA
policy issues within DoD. Fortunately, both he, individually, and his staff members were
highly proactive and dedicated to appropriate CA utilization in this emergency. They
continued to “percolate up” issues and suggestions relating to CA policy through the Office
of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, (DUSD-P), Mr. Paul Wolfowitz, during
the next several months, attempting to influence CA involvement to the greatest extert
7LTC Paul Mikesh, “Read Ahead Paper for the Civil Affairs Symposium” (Draft), dated 30 September 1991,
pp.1-2. A revised version of this paper was printed in the Proceedings. Cited hereafter as “Draft Read Ahead
Paper.”
8The Director, Joint Staff, LTG Michael Cams, appears to have been reacting negatively to “civilian” (DoD)
attempts to influence military (JCS) affairs. Such a response was not unusual. The author became aware of such
sensitivities during his period of service with the Joint Staff. LTG Cams also suggested in his response a lack
of understanding of CA capabilities and possible missions as they related to the Kuwait situation. This response
served to deprive the Chairman of high-quality CA advice on a regular basis. His senior CA persoD was a
Lieutenant Colonel, Dennis C. Barlow, an action officer in the Operations Directorate. Barlow was unable to
gain regular access to the Chairman or Director, Joint Staff throughout the war. This was most unfortunate since
he is a competent and well-informed individual, and could have been of immense help. As it was, Barlow spent
extensive periods of time trying to “percolate up’ ideas concerning CA operations and capabilities as they
influenced the war. Such organizational shortcomings significantly degraded the Joint Staffs understanding of.
and ability to respond to, CA-related issues.
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possible.9 An outside observer watching the ebb and flow of these events would have,
undoubtedly, been perplexed at the spectacle of the home service, the U. S. Army, as well
as the Joint Staff exhibiting little apparent interest in the enormously complex CA missions
associated with this jsis’° As it turned out external forces generated sufficient pressure
to insure appropriate action.
In September, 1990, the exiled 00K dispatched a team of twenty specialists to
Washington to establish a reconstruction planning structure. The 00K planned to utilize
funds on deposit in foreign banks to restore the rightful government as soon as the Iraqis
could be ejected from theft country. Mr. Fawn Al Sultan, assigned to lead the team,
planned to involve the United States heavily in the restoration and reconstruction effort.
Mr. Al Sultan and his colleagues were soon apprised of the presence of the USAR Civil
Affairs capability.
Doctrinally, the Joint Staff was supposed to request broad policy guidance on CA from the SECDEF. No
such request was ever made. By October, 1990, AS!) SO/UC had developed draft policy guidance to be offered
to UCS. It was never tr2ncnitted, however.
proponency on the Army Staff rests in DAMO-OD, the Civil Affairs Division, Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army. This thy organization was not
known for its proactive stance in matters pertaining to the mobilization of CA units and personnel for Operation
DESERT SHWLD/STORM. Indeed, those associated with the Division were viewed by some within the CA
community as obstructionist in posture, a peculiar stance for the entity charged with promotion of the CA cause
within the Army. The writer was told of an instance in which one Joint Staff officer, perplexed by the negative
attitudes being displayed by a CA Branch representathe, commented that this person was ‘like a used car
salesman who didn’t want to sell his cans.’(Interview by the wrüer with Colonel Thomas A. Timmes, Chief,
PSYOP and Civil Affairs Branch, The Joint Staff, 10 June 199L)
ttFawzi Al Sultan was an official with the World Bank, who reported directly to the Crown Prince and the
Emir of Kuwait. He was not directly accountable to the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United States, Saud Nasir
M-Sabah. As weeks passed, tensions arose between these two stsong personalities with the result that, in mid.
December, 1990, Mr. Al Sultan was called home for consultation and replaced by thrahim Shaheen, who carried
on the work of the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program (KERr).
Elliott states: • A man of considerable intellect and absolute character, Shaheen brought his formidable
integrity, knowledge of current Kuwthti politics and understanding of Americans . . . to the table. When Shaheen
took over, there was immediate integration of the US-Kuwait effort.. .“ (Randall T. Elliott, ‘The Kuwaiti (sic)
Task Force”. Read ahead paper for CA Symposium, 3 October 1991, p. 5.) Cited hereafter as “rr.
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As it happened, Colonel Randall Elliott, a Reserve officer assigned to the 352nd CA
Command, also held a middle management position within the Department of State.12
Furthermore, he was acquainted with Ambassador-designate Edward (Skip) Gnehm, who
was then in Washington awaiting confirmation and deployment to Kuwait. Elliott foresaw
the appropriateness of Civil Affairs involvement in Kuwaid reconstruction and, apparently
not trusting normal bureaucratic processes within the military establishment, called the
matter to the attention of various State Department officials, including Ambassador
Gneha’3 Gnehm saw the potential for such an arrangement and discussed the matter
with Ambassador M-Sabah and the Kuwaid delegation, who were immediately receptive to
the idea of involving CA personnel. State passed the request to the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs, the Hon. Henry S. Rowan, who made
arrangements through the Director of the Joint Staff for a briefing on Civil Affairs
capabffities.’4
OASD SO/UC had not been idle during this period. Staff officers had been awaiting
the results of a preliminary on-ground CA assessment being conducted by an early-deploying
t2Randall Eliot’s dvilian tide was: Division Chief, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of
State. His mihtny i.c.dgnment with the 352nd CA Command was as the 0-5, in which capacity he served as the
operations officer for the Command. In his previous assignment within the 352nd he had served as CENTCOM
Team Chief.
t3ColoneI Effiott was known within the Civil Affairs community as a bright, independent, and hard-charging
individual with a penchant for ‘working around’ the establishment when necessary, as he saw it, to the success
of the mission. He had, over the years, offended more than a few more traditional officials within both the
military and the Department of State, some of whom accused him of ‘roguing out’ on occasion.
14bdor Gnehm had served as DoD’s Deputy Assistant Secetary for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, so was fmilb,r with the mechncmc for inserting such a request into the military system. Fortunately,
the ASD/ISA and the Assistant Seaetaiy of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (under
whose auspices Civil Affairs fell), were men of vision and action. Overriding a somewhat lukewarm response
from the Army staff, these individuals orchestrated the holding of the briefing for the Kuwaith.
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team from the the 96th CA Bn, the only active component CA unit? The message,
received on 3 September, convinced SO/TIC that the battalion was”.. . operating beyond
its capability and was not able to conduct an adequate assessment of this magnitude. The
message also.. . confirmed our suspicions that CENTCOM was ill-prepared to conduct CA
operations.” It was feared that ARCENT (the Army component of CENTCOM) was
beading toward the creation of”.. . another ‘ad hoc’ CA organization.. . “similar to the
one that had been deployed in Operation JUST CAUSE with less than optimal results.’6
This development generated a fluny of activity between SO/UC and the Office of
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs on the topic of potential
Civil Affairs missions in the CENTCOM AO. Shortly thereafter, a briefing was set up for
the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program (KERP) representatives in Washington. The
stage was being set for the temporary removal of Comimrnd and Control of the CA
assistance program from regular military channels.
The briefing was given on 4 October 1990 by the senior CA officer on the Joint Staff,
Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Barlow, from the Psychological Operations/Civil Affairs Branch
of the Directorate for Current Operations (J-33). LTC Barlow addressed an audience which
a There were 37 Civil Affairs units within the Army structure at the time DESERT SHIELD began Thirty.
six of these were 2cSgned to the US. Army Reserve and one to the Active Component. These units include a
total of 4822 personnel of afi grades. Civil Affairs is a branch of the Army, comparable in many respects to
Military Intelligence Military Police, but resuided to the U.S. Army Reserve. USAR officers and enlisted
personnel ic.dgned to CA wear a distinctive branch insignia. Active component officers itcigned to CA are not
nLc.gned to the Branch but are eligible for a CA spedalty designator and skill code.
16 Mikesh, Draft Read Ahead Paper, Sept. 30, 199L, p. 3.
The assessment, received in message dtd 0319572 Sep 90, suggested three aitical CA Identification
and acquisition of host nation support (IINS); development of CA guidance; and phnning for follow-on
operations. The message indicated that the addition of personnel would enable the 96th Bn”. . . to meet
immediate needs.” The message did indicate that, as the theater matured, there would be a need for the addition
of RC units. Nevertheless, it was SO/UCs assessment that the 96th team did not hilly grasp the CA mission
potentiaL Part of the problem lay in the faa that the 96th Bn is configured as a Direct Support unit, often
tharaaeriz.ed as the fire brigade” among CA units. The personnel assigned to that organization often have a
limited understanding of the orrnintion and operational capabilities of an RC Civil Affairs unit, having never
been c.dgned to such organizations.
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included Ambassador Gnehm; Lieutenant General Tom Kelly, (the 3-3); Mi. Fawzi Al
Sultan, Coordinator of the Kuwaiti Team; Mr. Sulayman Abd al-Razaq Mutawa, the Kuwaiti
Minister of Planning; and Shaykh ‘All Khalifa al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti Minister of Finance.
LTC Barlow’s briefing was well received by the Kuwaiti representatives, who inquired as to
how a request for Civil Affairs assistance could be initiated. The response by U. S.
representatives suggested the appropriateness of having the Kuwaiti Ambassador address
a letter to President Bush requesting such aid. This letter was forthcoming on 9 October
1990.’ It stated, in pan:
In violation of international law and norms of conduct between
sovereign nations, you are aware of the aggression carried out by Iraq against
Kuwait.... We call upon the friendship and assistance of. . . the United
States . . . in putting together an emergency and recovery program. More
specifically, we have . . . need for certain specialties and expertise resident,
among other U. S. agencies, in the United States Department of Defense.”8
On 19 October, 1990, Mr. Locher, the ASD SO/UC attended the Deputies
Committee meeting, during which the decision was made to provide advice and assistance
to Kuwait in their restoration planning efforts.’9 In the interests of time and efficiency, the
National Security Council (NSC) recommended that DOS, OSD and JCS establish a steering
committee to make the necessary arrangements, with ISA taldng the lead for DoD. Mr.
17The respondent was Mr. Sam Routson, Director of Mission Activities for ASD/SOUC, who volunteered
to assist in the drafting of the letter. His request being accepted, Routson prepared the initial draft of the letter
eventually sent Since the meeting was under the sponsorship of the Asst. Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs, Mr. Routson’s actions elicited some astonishment on the part of others present, who felt his
offer to be inappropriate under the circumstances. Nevertheless, Routson’s action energized the process, with
great success.
18 Saud Nasir Al-Sabah, KEA/270/90, Letter dated October 9, 1990, pp. 1-2. As mentioned above, Mr. Sam
Routson, Director of Mission Activities at SO/LIC, ‘coached’ the Kuwaitis in the preparation of the letter.
19 The Deputies Committee is in the National Security Council Chain of Command. The rank progression
from more to less senior is as foflows National Security Council, composed of the President, Vice-President,
SECSTATh and SECDEF; the Principals’ Committee, composed of SECSTATE, SECDEF, Director of Central
Intelligence, Chairman and Vice-Chairman of JCS, the National Security Advisor and the White House Chief
of Staff; the Deputies Committee, composed of representatives from NSC, DoD, DOS, CIA, and JCS.
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Rowan quickly issued a set of draft terms of reference (TOR) and circulated them for
comment to JCS. In addition, Rowan asked that a military service be designated executive
agent for the project and that appropriately qualified personnel be assigned to the various
working committees specified in the TOR.20
The TOR specified that the U. S. would have, as its objective, the provision of
assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait in the planning of governmental
restoration efforts to be implemented upon the withdrawal of Iraqi forces. DOS and OSD
were to have joint primary responsibility for development of a civic restoration program,
with other departments and agencies being called upon when appropriate. A U. S. Steering
Group Committee, chaired by DOS, with representatives from State and DoD, was to
oversee the planning effort. A U. S.-Kuwait Committee on Emergency and Recovery
Programs was to be formed, consisting of the U. S. Steering Group Committee and
representatives of the Kuwaiti Government in exile. Planning was to be undertaken in the
twenty Civil Affairs functional areas, with working committees for each area established as
appropriate. The GOK was to execute all contracts for services and equipment with civilian
firms. The U. S. government was to be allowed to request reimbursement for the cost of
various services rendered. Twice-monthly reports were to be submitted to representatives
of DOS, OSD, JCS, the NSC, and CENTCOM.2’ The terms of reference were approved
20 Mikesh, ‘Draft Read Ahead’, p.4. Mikesh points out that, initially, OASD (SO/UC) was not invited to
participate in the work of the Steering Group Committee as it oversaw DoD’s role in providing assistance to the
00K BG Charles E. Wilhelm, Deputy Assistant Seaetaiy for Missions and Applications, sent a letter to Art
Hughes, DASD NESA/ISA on 5 November, calling to his attention the role of OASD (SO/LIC) as functional
proponent for CA within DoD, following which representatives from SO/UC participated in Steering Committee
meetings. Thus, regional and functional proponents worked together in harmony during the operation.
21
‘Terms of Reference--United States Emergency and Reconstruction Assistance to the State of Kuwait,’
(Draft), November 13, 1990, pp. 1-2. The TOR was prepared by NESA/ISA, and was largely the work of Mr.
Fred Smith, of that office.
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on 5 November 1990 and working level groups to oversee implementation of the project
were established.
During the period 5-15 November 1990, intense debate occurred within the Army and
the Joint Staff over: appropriateness of DoD’s providing such advice and assistance to the
00K and whether the Army was the tight organization to lead the effort. ‘The Army did
not want to get involved in a long-term non-military project which would divert resources
from military operations and thought that the reconstruction of Kuwait was a job for the
Department of State.U In the event that OSD were to get involved, both the Army and
the Emergency Planning office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy felt that the
mission should be performed by an “ad hoc’ group created for that purpose. The Army
favored creation of a composite task force composed of representatives from various
elements of the force structure (Medical, Military Police, Communications, Engineers,
Quartermaster) with augmentation from Civil Affairs, the overall structure to be
commanded by an active component general officer? The generally negative tone in
Army communications issued throughout the process suggests a lack of confidence in the
John R. Brinkerhoff, Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq.
Washington: Office, Chief of the Army Reserve, August 1991, p.53. Brinkerhoff indicates that the Army IdE it
had been “railmaded,” not allowed to participate in the decision-making process concerning whether or rim
assistance should be provided to the Kuwaids. Their behavior during organizational meetings suggested
displeasure with the way in which the whole matter had been handled. Cited hereafter as Waging the W3(
FLShCI states: ‘Resistance to using CA planners in this capacity came specifically from a particuIazI
unlikely source, Department of the Army’s CMI Affairs Office.’ (John T. Fishel, ‘War, Peace, and Civil Militan
Operations: The Role of Civil Affairs in Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT STORM and PROVIDE
COMFORT.’ Unpublished paper prepared for Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Dc ie rise
University, May 13,1992, p.9.) Cited hereafter as War, Peace, and Civil Military Operations.
This view probably found its genesis in the structure of the Military Support Group (MSG) utilued in
Panama during Operation JUST CAUSE. The MSG, in turn, was a modified version of a ‘type Securit’.
Assistance Force (SAP), doctrinally prescribed in FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict (1981 edition.) The SAF
was restructured somewhat and renamed the Foreign Internal Defense Aunentation Force (FIDAF) in the I ‘I
version of that manual. See J.TFishel, Liberation. Occupation, and Rescue; War Termination in Desert Storm.
(Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, 1992,) pp. 63-65. Cited berafter as ‘Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue’
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capability of the Reserve Component CA units to provide the needed seMces?4
Emergency Planning submitted a matrix involving the distribution of responsibilities among
twenty-seven departments within the U. S. government. Their paper also suggested the
assignment of an officer from the Corps of Engineers to Ambassador Gnehm’s staff?
Department of the Army was supported in its concerns by operatives within the Joint
Staff, who felt that the Department of State was the proper agency to lead the effort, it
being primarily civilian in nature. A good deal of residual sensitivity existed within these
organizations, the legacy of the Panama Operation, JUST CAUSE. During that activity
DoD had found itself serving as “lead” agency long after the shooting had stopped,
inadequately supported by DOS and other agencies of the U. S. government which, it was
felt, should have taken political and fiscal responsibility for the restoration of services in that
troubled nation. ‘The Director of the Joint Staff wanted to make certain that this time the
Department of State and other U. S. government agencies would panicipate.”
Having been overruled in the matter of RC CA employment in support of the GOK staff members within
DAMO-ODP, the office charged with CA planning proponency on the Army staff, continued to suggest the
inappropriateness of CA utilization. In one memorandum, they stated: The Army is not structured or resourced,
and does not have the . . . primary mission to accomplish the full range of the mission contemplated in the
Kuwaiti request . . . . Civil Affairs units do not possess material resources or equipment to directly provide
physical support to the civil sector.’ At another point, the memo states: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) has extensive expertise and experience in both public works management and disaster recovery
operations.’ (Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, %iilitary Support in the Civil Restoration
of Kuwait,’ Memorandum dated 24 October 1990, pp. 2-3.) Clearly, the writers felt it more appropriate to pass
this action to the Corps, rather than involving the RC CA community. This apparent attempt to “damn with faint
praise’ drew a sharp response from the Office, Chief Army Reserve, which ‘nonconcur(red) with the negative
tone of the letter. . . (Memorandum from Office, Chief Army Reserve dated 26 October 1990). OCAR went
on to strongly defend the utilization of RC CA personnel for the mission.
Mikesh,’Draft Read Ahead Paper,’ pp.4-5. Mikesh indicates that SO/UC, profiting from the lessons of
Operation JUST CAUSE, supported a strong role for CA in pre-hostilities planning, to ensure that the CINC
and DoD could function effectively as both a liberating and occupying force in Kuwait and Iraq, if required.
Brinkerhoff, Waging the War,’ p.53. Fishel states:’...resistance came, initially from the Joint Staff which
felt that DoD, and particularly the Army, had been left holding the fmandal bag for CMO operations in Panama
when other government agencies reneged on promises to contribute. (Fishet”War, Peace, and Civil Military
Operations, p.9.)
Elliott states: ‘The Panama experience had soured some in high places on the costs--who would pay for
Civil Affairs efforts--and this issue, as well as involvement of the U.S. Government as a whole, had to be settled.’
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Because of the Army’s hesitance to commit to CA utilization, it was decided within
OSD that the Army should not be designated as executive agent for the operation, as would
have normally been the case.27 It was felt that the operation would not be vigorously
prosecuted if matters were left to the Army. As can be imagined, this caused considerable
embarrassment within Army circles. On 19 November, three assistant secretaries--ISA,
SO/UC, and Reserve Affairs, made a concerted effort to get things moving and on 21
November, after another exasperating last-minute holdup, this one generated by the Director
of the Joint Staff, JCS reluctantly approved the formation of the Kuwait Task Force utilizing
Civil Affairs soldiers?2 On 22 November, CICS sent a message to the Chief of Staff of the
Army and CNCSOC requesting activation of elements of the 352nd CA Command. The
Kuwait Task Force (KTF) had been created?9
It should be noted that during the period 7 August 1990, when Operation DESERT
SHIELD commenced, (designated C day in military parlance) until 2 October 1990, General
(Randall T. Elliott, “Kuwait Task Force: A Brief History’, {n.p., n.d.}, p3.) Cited hereafter as “Brief History.”
27 The following exerpts from an Army-generated Memorandum for the Record give a sense of the
frustration felt within the organization. “Mn. Fred Smith. . . called a meeting of the so-called working group.
I attended to look out for Army’s interests.. . . The Army and OSD legal experts raised some substantive
issues concerning TOR, but were ‘blown oft’. My perception is that ISA cannot be bothered with anything that
threatens progress as they perceive it, that is USAR CA soldiers on active duty working with the Kuwaitis,
ASAP . . . . There was much discussion . . . over executive agency. However, it appears that the JCS position
will be that there is no need for one.” (Memorandum entitled “US-Kuwait DoD CA Working Group, dated 7
November 1990.)
“When the matter came before the DJS he stated again that the assistance.. . was more properly a role
for DOS and. . . directed that the alert of the 352nd be cancelled. When BGen (Charles) Wilhelm learned of
this development he provided Mr. Lecher with some background information in preparation for a meeting that
evening with the DJS, LTG (M.P.C.) Casts and Mr. Rowen. Both BGen Wilhelm and Mr. Lecher believed that
this was a doctrinally correct CA mission. Mr. Lecher saw CA as the medium for bringing all the resources of
the government to bear on the problem . . . The meeting concluded with the agreement that the caWup of the
352nd would be restored . . . . The unit officially reported on December 3rd. (Mikesh, “Draft Read Ahead
Paper, p.5.)
Message, OCS, Subject: Restoration of Kuwait, 22 November 1990. Things were moving so rapidly that
the WIT had been hand at work for several weeks before President Bush approved the concept of proiding
assistance to the Kuwaith, according to Mn.Fred Smith, of ISA.
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Schwartzkopf and his planners had been operating on the assumption that their mission was
to prevent the invasion of Saudi Arabia, protecting those allies from further incursions by
the Iraqis. During that time the world political situation evolved rapidly, as did President
Bush’s views on appropriate military options. Further, the mood of the American people
underwent a steady shift toward a more aggressive posture vtc-a-vis Iraq. American and
coalition forces in Saudi Arabia had been augmented to such an extent that great confidence
existed in the Coalition’s ability to repel any attempt at invasion by Saddam Hussein. By the
2nd of October 1990, General Colin Powell, the CJCS, was able to indicate that “
Washington was impatiently awaiting an ‘offensive option’ from Central Command.” On
6 October, General Schwarakopf directed his planners to assume the availability of an
additional armored corps and to begin planning for a massive flanking attack to the West?°
General Schwanzkopf and his planners have come under heavy criticism in Civil
Affairs circles and in some offices within OSD for failing to plan “early and adequately’ for
proper employment of CA assets in the reestablishment of vital services in Kuwait. While
it is true that Commanders are expected to plan for all contingencies, Cfl”TCCENT was
laboring under serious informational and directional constraints as well as carrying a massive
decisional and operational burden. He presents himself in his writings as struggling to
understand the rapidly changing political environment and to respond appropriately in a
reactive, as opposed to a proactive mode, at least during the early months of DESERT
SHIELD. As part of his response CUCCENT worked himself hard. He is reported to have
kept a strenuous schedule and to have been exceptionally demanding with his staff.
° Sthwanzkopf ‘Her&, p. 354. The General had imported a team of six planning wizards from Fort
Leavenworth, KS, to assist the CENTCOM staff. Informally dubbed variously the Gang of Four’ and ±c Jeddi
lights,’ these talented officers had already begun to examine possible offensive options, submitting one plan
as early as 6 October 1990.
Canton, Kuwait Task Force Paper, Page 14
Because of his extensive exposure to the Middle East, the General viewed himself
as something of an expert on the topic. Indeed, he was quite effective in his dealings with
his Saudi counterparts. One is struck however, by his testimony to the effect that he was
routinely drawn into the making of decisions that were clearly within the purview of Civil
Affairs. General Schwartzkopf speaks, for example, of multiple direct dealings with the
Saudis in the areas of religion, sensitivity to local customs and traditions, commercial
relations, and other areas of CA concern Had adequate CA assets been available to him
during the early months of DESERT SHIELD, better plans could have been made for
operations in Kuwait and better CA-related execution orchestrated for activities in Saudi
Arabia. Arguably, such foresight would have reduced the burden on the General himself.
Unfortunately, there is no indication that he was aware of or concerned about the
employment of CA assets, perhaps because of his lack of knowledge of theft capabilities,
perhaps because of earlier experiences of a negative nature involving Civil Affairs forces in
particular and the Reserve Components in general.3’
A former member of the CENTCOM J-5 (Plans and Policy) staff states that the
decision not to activate the RC Theater Army Area Command supporting Third Army
(ARCENT), “... has been attributed to the Active Component leadership’s evaluation of
Reserve Component units’ ability . . . combined with the experience of AC leaders in
One can speculate that General Schwartzkopf and his senior staff members held the traditional view that
CA units are equipped only to engage in civil administration functions of the type exercised during and after
WWII. Whatever the reasons behind his behavior, CA was inadequately represented in the area of operations
until December, 1990 when advance parties from sixteen RC CA units were called to active duty and deployed
to the Gulf, augmenting the 96th CA Bn (AC) and elemeots of the 3rd and 4th CA Groups, USMC.
Sthwaitzkopf’s comments concerning restoration of services in Kuwait following cessation of hostilities include
the following: “We had to bring Kuwait City back to Life, which meant repairing and turning on the water supply,
electrical power grid, and telephones, helping the police maintain order, . . and a thousand other tasks. And
until the UN approved a cease-fire agreement that would permit us to end our occupation, we had to serve as
the government of southern traq--maintiining order, providing basic services, and caring for the thousands of
refugees fleeing from upheavals in the North.” (Schwartzkopf, Hero”, pp. 490-91.) In this catalogue of services
and functions he discusses many basic CA missions without ever indicating an awareness of the existence of the
CM] Affairs Branch, or of the WrF.
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training and evaluating. the (RC) leadership . . .“ He later references “the apparent
distrust of the Reserve Component leadership and command and control organizations
by the Active Component leadership.”32 One can readily imagine the effect of such
widely-held views upon those decisions affecting the activation and deployment of RC Civil
Affairs units during early months of DESERT SHIELD.
CENTCOM’s lack of attention to CA-related issues put the Kuwait Task Force
(KTF) in a peculiar position. Having been placed under the Command and Control of the
Interagency Steering Group Committee, composed of OSD, DOS, and JCS, with nominal
support being supplied by the Department of the Army,the WIT had no formal relationship
with CENTCOM.33 Consequently, they received almost no information concerning
CENTCOM plans. CENTCOM, in turn, knew relatively little about the KrFs activities and
intentions.M This peculiar situation can explained, at least in part, by the fact that the
KTF, working closely with the Kuwaitis, was not authorized access to mission-related
32Douglas W. Craft, An Ooeradonal Analysis of the Persian Gulf War (Carlisle, Pa.: US Amy War College
Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), p.54. Craft further comments: ‘Through its lack of confidence in the Reserve
Component leadership, the Army further demonstrated a lack of confidence in the individuals that form a
powerful segment of the Total Army. Unfortunately, the rifts created by fallout from that decision threaten to
color. . . the development of the future force structure of the Total Amy.” (p.55). The major struggle taking
place between the AC, USAR and National Guard at the time of this writing (February, 1993) over issues of
force structure and mission suggest the correctness of Craft’s comments.
Brinkerhoff reports that KTF members felt DA, more specifically the Operations Directorate of DCSOPs,
failed to support them adequately. (Brinkerhoff, “Waging the War”, pp.55-56.)
Regarding relationships between the KIT and CENTCOM, it should be noted that a CENTCOM staff
officer, CCL Randy Conklin, was appointed to the US-Kuwait Civil Affairs Working Group, a subordinate entity
of the US Steering Group Committee assied oversight of the WIT. There is no evidence to indicate that
Conklin was active in the working group. (Roster endUed “US-Kuwait Civil Affairs Working Group’, no date.)
‘Conklin didn’t attend a single meeting after the initial meeting.” (Marginal note By LTC Paul Mikesh in
response to draft of this paper.)
Colonel Elliott is of the opinion that CCL Conklin placed a low priority on the activities of the KIT.
He seemed disinterested. Elliott provided him a copy of Annex G (Civil Affairs) to the OPORD, but he failed
to forward it to CENTCOM in a timely fashion, with the result that the KIT received a ‘hot” phone call for
failing to provide the requested document. (Conversation with Colonel Randall Elliott on 2 February 1993.)
General Schwartzkopfs book makes no mention of the KIT, a fact which suggests that he was either
unaware of its existence or that he felt its activities were insufficiently important to discuss in his memoir.
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classified information, so far as CENTCOM was concerned. Indeed, CENTCOM worked
hard to exclude the coalition members from access to the OPL4Ns being developed, for
fear that the Arabs would compromise the operation prior to execution. Whether justified
or not, there was a healthy degree of cynicism concerning the trustworthiness of these affies
in classified matters?5 In addition, at the time the KTF was created, Colonel Elliott had
been informed that the KW would serve as a stateside planning group only--that there were
no plans to deploy the group to the AO. Consequently, the WIT was initially structured as
a planning cell only. Upon receiving the deployment request from Mr. Robert Kimmitt, of
DOS, and the Crown Prince of Kuwait, it was necessasy that the KTh reconfigure itself
sufficiently to be able to conduct operational missions
Following a series of “on-again, off-again” alert orders, the KTh was called to active
duty on 1 December 1990?’ The group initially mustered 57 Civil Affairs functional
specialists, and eventually reached a strength of 63 officers and enlisted personnel covering
a majority of the twenty CA specialties. Most of these personnel had been identified
As late as January 9, CE?’ffCOM had not informed the coalition partners of the date and time of attack
on the Iraqis. Sthwantzkopf states: We were particularly concerned about King Fahd, who made it a practice
to discuss everØing including state secrets, openly with his princes.” (Schv.’annkopf, “Hero”, p.408.)
This change in mission evolved during COL Elliott’s visit to Tail Saudi Arabia, to brief the Emir and
Crown Prince on KIT activities. Upon his return to Washington on 18 January, 1991, Elliott directed the WIT
to prepare to deploy within ten days. The team arrived in Dhanhan, Saudi Arabia, on 31 January 1991.
13 November 1990--USACAPOC calls saying that portions of unit will be activated; 17 November-
USASOC calls stating that unit is alerted for mobilization; 18 November--USACAPOC calls to cancel the
activation; 20 November-BG Mooney receives a call informing him that a portion of the unit will be activated,
details to follow later that day (20 Nov 1990) mission was canceled and personnel ordered to stand down; 21
November—USACAPOC notifies 352nd that 50-60 personnel would be activated on 1 December 1990.
The official notification of mobilization was received on 29 November, 1990. The confusion engendered within
the 352nd CA Cmd was considerable.
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through use of a newly established and computerized CA Skills Data Base and were drawn
from throughout the 352nd CA Command’s CAPSTONE trace?8
When the KTh was called to active duty, Brigadier General Howard T. Mooney was
listed as Commander. New to CA, he was an experienced logistician and transportation
officer, skills that were uidmately to stand him in good stead in the Persian Gulf. Activated
on 1 December 1990, he was released from active duty on 3 December, having been
informed that the Department of the Army wouid not validate his call up. He had no
further official connection with the KTh until his arrival in Saudi Arabia in January, 1991.
His Task Force deputy, Colonel Randall Elliott, became director of the KTF and served in
that capacity for the duraflon? Reporting to Washington, D.C. after a brief period of
administrative in-processing at Ft. Meade, Md., the WIT sought to locate its own office
space and to procure furniture, both tasks being quickly accomplished with the assistance
of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers and the General Services Adminictradon. Office
The final 7 personnel assigned to the KIT were designated by USACAPOC and included a number of
specialties not found within the CA Community. These included: Explosive Ordnance Disposal specialist and
Military Police Officer, among others.
Elliott states: The CA Skills DB . . . was ready to use in the summer of 1990. This invaluable tool let
those who organized the KIT view the entire 352d and the units it commanded to search for specific d4ilian
skills to complement the military skills of dvii affairs penonnei’ @ffiott ‘Brief History, p.4.)
39BG Joseph Huneau was given the sensitive cask of informing BG Mooney about the reversal of his call-up,
which was a source of great embarrassment to BG Mooney. One of the explanations given was that Mooney’s
activation would have resulted in exceeding the authorized ceiling for general officers serving on active duty at
any time, a matter of ongoing concern throughorn the war. It should be pointed out that exceptions to policy
were made, however, as in the case of BG Donald Campbell, called up in April, 1991 and placed on nAD
(Temporary Tour of Active Duty) by exception to policy, along with two other GO’s, in June, 1991. Brinkerhoff
attributes the reversal in Mooney’s call-up ton. . . the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon Sullivan.’
All requests for Reserve general officers were to be referred to the Chief of Staff for decision. Apparently, the
Army was angered that General Mooney was called up without having first obtained CSA approval.
(“Brinkerhoff, ‘Waging the Wa?, p. 56.) Other sources indicate that BG Mooney was not well received by DA
representatives, who took exception to the process by which the 1JE had been created and that this fact may
have figured in his release from duty.
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equipment was furnished by Department of the Army.4° The KTF moved into leased space
three blocks from the offices of the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program (KERP), a
convenient arrangement, and commenced assisting the Kuwaiti team with the business of
planning for the eventuai restoration of that unfortunate nation.
Elliott structured the work to be completed into four phases: 1—Task orgamzm , 2--
Initial estimate and scope of work; 3—First draft of plans; 4—OPLAN (Annex 0) completion;
preparation for deployment. Organizational plzinning presented the KTh with special
chalienges, since no one could predict with certainty what conditions would exist within
Kuwait after the Iraqis withdrew. Consequently, the KIT initially attempted to develop
restoration matrices predicated upon varying degrees of destruction. This proving to be an
unworkable approach, they soon shifted to a ‘\vorst case” scenario, operating on the
assumption that lesser degrees of destruction could be readily managed under such a
planning approach.4’ The Kuwaitis, having been in the U. S. for several months, had
already initiated the contracting process on a limited basis. The KIT immediately joined
the process, providing advice and assistance, doing research on potential contractors and
° Elliott reports:” The Army Operations Center had been initially tasked as the support agency for the KTF.
However, the AOC was not in position to offer any support and indeed turned out to be critical of the support
that the KIT acquired on its own. The Corps of Engineers (COE), however, offered to assist and a building.
was located.” (Elliott, icir, p.3.
Another member of the KIT reports that the Task Force received assistance from the Office of the
Adminktrathe Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Milt Hamilton, indicating that this was a normal and
appropriate mccinn for that office. Apparently, it is reported, the leadership of the KIT was initially unaware
of the availability of this admh.ktrathe support and, consequently, proceeded to make their own arrangements
to obtain what they needed to get started. This lack of understanding of standard operating procedures probably
contributed to the confusion surrounding the initiation of operations. (From a conversation with LTC Dave
Mitchell, former member of the KIT, on January 19, 1993.)
There appear to have been some feelings of ill-will between members of the Army Staff and the CF.
Brinkerhoff states that “Some DA officials thought the KIT officers had a superior and arrogant attitude, ‘were
forgetting that they wore een suits’, and were getting big heads from consorting with ministers and high- level
officials.” (Brinkerhoff, Waging the War”, p. 56.)
Elliott, “icrr, p. 3.
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providing lists of such organizations to the Kuwaiti team, and sewing as a support structure
for the KERP. It was made clear from the outset that the Kuwaitis would negotiate and
sign all contracts—not the KTF—the members of which served as “honest brokers” throughout
the process. Ultimately, the Kuwaitis concluded 271 contracts worth approximately $685
million during the life of the KTF.42 Most of these were for such things as food, water,
medicine, power generation, emergency communications, uniforms, and vehicles. In line
with U. S. desires that the Kuwaitis “buy American” wherever feasible, over 80% of the total
dollar value of all contracts concluded was with U. S. finns.U It was during this stage of
operations that the KTF, sensing that the Kuwaitis had almost no experience in planning
a recovery of this magnitude, arranged for representatives of the U. S. Army Corps of
Engineers (COB) and of other federal agencies to brief the Kuwaiti governmental
representatives. From these briefing sprang the ultimate agreement that the COB should
play a major role in the restoration process.”
In addition to contractual services, the KTh became involved in the question of
protection of the human rights of Palestinians and other third-party nationals. In the case
of the Palestinians, stories of collusion with the Iraqis were filtering out of Kuwait, along
with horrifying stories of atrocities against Kuwaiti citizens.45 In keeping with time-
42 Elliott, KTF, p. 3. In ‘Brief History, p. 7, Elliott places the figure at $785 million.
‘ Elliott, ‘flP. pp. 3-4. ‘AU CA personnel had been informed of the necessity to avoid conflicts of interest
in contractual matters. According to one high official, the CA personnel were trusted by the Kuwaitis to give
objective advice.. . . the Kuwaids did not mist many of the other Americans beating at their doors for lucrative
contracts. The GOK is most appredathe of the honest and objective work done by the WIT....’ (Brinkerhoff,
‘Waging the War’,p. 58.)
“Elliott, ‘wrr, p.5. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the Federal Emergency Management
Mminicfraflon both conducted useful briefln for the GOK team during this period.
Message traffic examined by the author during his assignment with the Joint Staff was full of heart-rending
stories of murder, torture, and rape aimed at men, women and children. They were disturbing, to say the least,
and offered ememe provocation to members of the Kuwaid government in eñle.
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honored cultural traditions, the Kuwaitis planned to exact retribution from these
ma1efactors. The KTF, upon becoming aware of these intentions, began an organized
campaign of written and oral communication designed to dissuade the Kuwaitis from theft
intent, arguing that such behavior was unacceptable to the U. S. government and would be
embarrassing in the extreme. U. S. hiimsrn rights policies were included in all agreements
concluded with the Kuwaids. Ambassador Gnehm joined the discussion, repeatedly making
these same arguments with the GOK The impact of this persuasion upon the situation that
developed in Kuwait City after the Coalition forces reoccupied it was positive. Elliott states
that . . the KTF made a difference. . . . The physical presence of KTh personnel in
Hawally (the major Palestinian neighborhood) and physical intervention by WF personnel
had a calming effect We remain convinced that there were no officially sponsored or
sanctioned acts of violence.”4’
Another function performed by the KTF was the preparation of a Civil Affairs Annex
to Third U. S. Army’s (ARCENTs) OPLAN. Work was undertaken beginning on 25
December 1990, and a draft was completed by early January, 1991. Unfortunately,
aforementioned OPSEC considerations, coupled with the fact that the KTF was not at that
• as early as mid-December 1990 (we) realized the potential for massive human rights abuses...
following liberation. Members of the Kuwaifi government.. . began making threatening comments about
Kuwaid-P.Iacrininc who they perceived collectively as Iraqi collaborators. One.. . official in providing us with
a population estimate. . . to compute food requirements deleted the hail million Palesth.niinic in Kuwait. When
asked why.. . lie replied, ‘Let them eat sand.’ In another . . .conversadon another senior official disdosed
Kuwaifi plans . . . to deport immediately 50% of the remaining PaieHnh.n... .“ (Andrew Natsios,Prevenüng
Human Rights Abuse in Kuwait”, Read ahead paper for Proceedin2s”, dated October 23, 1991, p. 1.)
Elliott, ICrF,” p.4. Brinkerhoff states: “Colonel Ronald M. Smith, Chief of the Public Security and Safety
Division insisted on strict adherence to due process and maintenance of law and order. . . . While in Kuwait as
advisor to the police, he continued to advocate that stance. . . he personally rescued a Palestinian being
mistreated by. . . the Kuwaid resistance.(There were several other instances in which US personnel intervened
to prevent miscarriages of justice.) . . There was no blood bath, and mo& agree that excesses .. . were much
less than might otherwise have occurred if. . . Smith had not been involved. (Bñnkerhoff, “Waging the War’,
p. 60.)
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time subordinate to CENTCOM or ARCENT, prevented the degree of interorganizationai
coordination necessary for the preparation of high-quality strategic plans for CA
employment. CCJ5, the p1nning cell for CENTCOM, apparently made no effort to keep
the KTh abreast of plans for CMO that were being developed in theaterY These focussed
on five areas: 1. minimi7ng interference by and hazard to the civilian population in Saudi
Arabia; 2. development of contingency plans for temporary civil authority in occupied areas
of southern Iraq; 3. contingency plans for handling dislocated civilians in Kuwait in support
of the GOK 4. emergency and restoration services in Kuwait City and Kuwait; and 5.
repatriation of Enemy Prisoners of War.49
At the same time, the KIT was preparing its own Annex G to the ARCENT OPLkN
on a parallel and often non-intersecting course. The KrFs focus was upon long-term
restoration of the nation’s infrastructure in cooperation with the Government of Kuwait and
the U. S. County Team, while the ARCENT/CENTCOM plans focussed upon short-term
emergency services. These plans would not be compared until the KIT arrived in Kuwait,
with the unsurprising result that ARCENT and CENTCOM found the KIT’s early planning
efforts to be inappropriate and less than optimally usefiilP
4rishel states that,...whilc the KTF did attempt to keep CENTCOM and ASCENT informed about its
pInning its effxts in this regard were hardly the central focus of its activity. In short, the relationship between
the KTF and the t in-theater headquarters simply was not conducive to achieving unity of effort in strategic,
or even operational, pls’rmiiig for CMO. (Fishel, ‘War, Peace, and Civil Military Operations’, p. 13.)
“ Larry C. Blount,’Chil-Military Operatons during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM from a
USCENTCOM Perspective,’ in “Procccdin’. pp. 230-31.
Elliott states that rhe OPL4NS of both senior headquarters had already been completed (by the time
the KTF deployed to the AO), so some of the ICW effort was not as useflil as it could have been Elliott,
‘WF,’ p. 4.
Fishel states:” Because the KTF was not a CENTCOM asset it was not included in the distribution of
the war plans. As a result it did its CMO annex in the dark with respect to what other U.S. plans were
articulating. Thus, the annex produced by the IJF had major disconthuifies with the CA plans and annexes
produced by CENTCOM and ARCENT.’ (Fishel,’Uberation, Occupation, and Rescue’, p. 28.)
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In January, 1991, the KIT ceased operations in Washington, D.C., and deployed to
Saudi Arabia, arriving on 31 January. The move had been requested by the Emir of Kuwait,
with concurrence by the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Robert Kimmitt, and
the Steering Group Committee. Upon arrival in Saudi Arabia, the KTh was reunited with
its parent unit, the 352nd CA Command and took up its duties in support of the Kuwaiti
ministerial representatives with whom they had been working. There were some initial
problems concerning the future role of the KTF, which was operating on the assumption
that it would continue to support the Government of Kuwait in its long-term restoration and
reconstruction mission. CENTCOM, ARCENT, and the 352nd CA Command, on the other
hand, planned to reintegrate the KIT into the regular chain of command and to employ its
members in emergency restoration missions. The cmx of the matter was whether the KIT
as then constituted would continue to exist and, if so, to whom that structure would
report.51 It should be pointed out that message traffic received prior to its deployment had
suggested new organizational arrangements which would have, in effect, dismantled the
Fishel desathes the initial meeting between elements of the KIT and cas as follows:” Its initial
encounter . . was rocky, to say the least The KIT leadership was concerned that the orginrion would be
broken up as soon as CENTCOM gained control over it, while CENTCOM.. (planned to) do everything
necessary to establish that the KTF no longer was an independent plandng entity.. . but rather now was a
CENTCOM asset to be used as the CWC saw fit.” (Fishel,”Uberation, Occupation and RescuC, p. 23.)
Colonel Ron Smith, traveling with the KTF Advance party, offended Colonel Bob Ward, the Chief of
the Pot-MU Division of CCJ5, who had greeted him at the airport, by demanding aressively to know what
intentions CENTCOM bad concerning the break-up of the KIT, This introduction set a negative tone for early
interactions between the two organizations. ( From an interview with Colonel Ward conducted by the author on
19 November, 1991.)
Brinkerhoff states that “Observers at 050 thought that CENTCOM and ARCENT did not understand
what the KTF had been doing and did not want to get involved . . . . The KIT was considered a bunch of
Reservists who were trying to get into the act, an extension of 050 and “prima donnas” who were not military
guys.” CENTCOM and ARCENT wanted to break up the KIT and use the individuals to augment their own
staffs.”(Eflnkerhoff,Waging the War”, p. 64.)
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KTh.52 The situation was rectified by Ambassador Gnehm, who spoke directly with
Generai Schwartzkopf, seeking continued use of the WIT for the recovery and
reconstruction mission. The result was a compromise arrangement, in which a handful of
KTh officers were assigned to the performance of liaison duties at ARCENT and
CENTCOM, while the main body continued to plan with the Kuwaitis. Their emphasis
shifted at this point from long-term reconstruction to the emergency restoration of services,
in line with CENTCOM’s immediate requirements. They focussed their attention on the
provision of food, water, medical care, sanitation, transportation, telecommunications, and
electric power.53
Upon deployment to Saudi Arabia, the activities of the WIT became intertwined with
those of the larger structure established for the execution of the CA mission. BG Mooney,
having arrived in theater on 1 February 1991, was named Commander of the newly created
Combined CA Task Force (CCATF)?4 This structure included the fJF, now redesignated
52Message from USCINCCENT 161280Z Jan 91. rhe Kuwait Task Force can best support the long-term
goals by applying their unique expertise and knowledge of the Kuwaiti government’s plans to assist
USCENTCOM when directed in providing the initial emergency services to integrate the Kuwaid government’s
restoration actions and to ease the transition of civil affairs operations to the government of Kuwait’s control
-
- USCENTCOM plans to use the members of the 352nd to create 4 teams to best utilize their skills. One
team would remain in Washington. . - - a second team would remain at HO USCENTCOM - - - - A third team
would be deployed to USARCENT . . - .The fourth team would remain with the Kuwaiti government - . -
Elliott, ‘ICrF, ph. Elliott states that ‘Col Sadek, the KTF deputy, had identified a key shortcoming in
plinning--the emergency phase, between combat and when CA forces would be able to..start work. As a
consequence, the KTF began concentrating on the emergency phase of reconstrnthoa” Jkit
Colonel Ellion also reported that; upon the lCrFs arrival in Kuwait Citç a hiatus occurred in the KTFs
interface activities with the Kuwaifi ministers, who did not appear in the city for over two weeks following the
cease fire. Effiott feels the Kuwaitis were appalled at the extent of the damage, exacerbated by the pall cast by
hundreds of oil well fires set by the retreating Iraqis and, consequently, were reluctant to leave Saudi Arabia to
commence the process of reconstituting the government. He reports that signficant persuasion was required
before the ministers appeared in Kuwait City. (From a conversation with Colonel Elliott on 2 Feb 1991)
It had long been planned that BG Mooney would serve as ARCENT 05 upon deployment. Indeed, the
Colonel occupying that position, Jim Ken, recommended this accignment in late January, 1991. ARCENT CO
LTG John Yeosock decided to name BG Mooney Commander of the CCATF instead. Brinkerhoff sas that
‘General Mooney got the feeling that ARCENT did not know what to do with a Civil Affairs general officer.’
(Brinkerhoff,Waging the War’, p. 65.)
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the DCSREC (Deputy Chief of Staff for Reconstruction), although the name KTh continued
to be used by those familiar with its operations. This move was probably designed, at least
in pan, to ameliorate some of the hard feelings and concerns within ARCENT and
CENTCOM over the unusual circumstances surrounding the creation and operations of the
KTF up to that time.55 The CCATF was, in turn, assigned on 13 February 1991 to Task
Force Freedom (TFF), a composite service support unit composed of the CCATF and a
Support Command Task Force commanded by the DCG of the 22nd Support Command,
BG Kenneth Guest. BG(P) Robert Frix, the DCG of ARCENT, was named Commander
of TFF. This arrangement worked vezy well. As BHnkerhoff stated: “General F± provided
the high level coordination and the clout needed to get resources. General Guest provided
the logistical support. General Mooney provided the Civil Affairs know-how.”
The ground war commenced on 24 February 1991 and the CCATF was ordered to
Kuwait City. Two KiT assessment teams reached the city on 26 February, with the main
body arriving on 1 March 1991. Assessment teams were sent out early that day, performing
damage assessments and initiating humanitarian assistance. It was soon determined that the
The CCATF included, in addition to the 10?, the 431st and 432nd CA Companies, CA elements from
the Kuwaid and Saudi Arabian armies, representatives of the US Corps of Engineers, designated the Kuwait
Emergency Recovery Office (flO), British Engineers, Explosive Ordnance Detachments from several nations,
liaison elements from the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Kuwaiti Red Crescent, and a
composite team composed of personnel from USAID’s omcc of Foreign Disaster Assistance and MD. Also
present were consultants from Intertect, a private consulting firm spedfl’ing in disaster relief. The 96th CA Bn
(AC) was also ndgned to the CCATF, but remained OPCON to ARCENT. (‘Combined Civil Affairs Task
Force Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM After Action Report, April 1991, p. 5.) Cited hereafter as
‘CCATF.
% Brinkerhoff,%’aging the Wa?, p.67. ft was widely believed that BG Mooney was not assigned a more
senior role because he was newly arrived in theater, was a Reservist, and was unknown within the AC
community. Furthermore, he had not yet established a strong track record within the CA community, which
exhibits parochial attitudes toward outsiders. Mooney was a Transportation and Quartermaster officer who had
not previously served in CA. His assignment as Commander, 352nd CA Cmd in 1929 had generated significant
controversy within the Civil Affairs community. As it turned out, he performed well and was accorded great
credit by CG ARCENT, including temporary Command of TFF and the award of the Legion of Merit. He was
also designated to lead the RC marching unit in the DESERT STORM National Victory Parade, held on 8 June
1991, an additional honor.
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city was in much better condition than U. S. forces had been led to believe. There was a
good deal of water stored in rooftop tanks, food had been stockpiled by the inhabitants, and
even the hospitals were operating at minimal levels. The major shortages were in electric
power and an ongoing water supply. The Iraqis had destroyed the power generation
facilities as pan of theft hasty withdrawal from the city. Without power, it was not possible
to pump water for business or home use. The CCATF pitched in, coordinating with the
engineers on restoration of these vital services, with good results. As discussed earlier, CA
personnel also participated in the prevention of human rights abuses involving Palestinians
and other third country nationals.
WIT personnel,along with other CA personnel in the area, assisted in a variety of
others areas: provision of emergency care at a shopital for mentally and physically impaired
children; assisting dislocated civilians; restoring the educational infrastructure; assisting in
restoration of garbage services and sewage operations; restoring public archives and
monuments; supporting the U. S. ambassador and the embassy staff in a variety of tasks:
providing advice and assistance on financial and currency issues; clearing unexploded
demolitions; assisting in fighting the 729 oil well fires set by the departing Iraqis; and
working with the media to provide accurate and current information to all interested
parties.57 The variety of tasks in which the CA community was engaged and the
professionalism with which the soldiers performed are immensely impressive.
Over a period of several weeks, the seven functions deemed critical by the KiT and
TFF changed in status from “red to green” with the restoration of essential services and
availability of additional supplies. It soon became possible to release the tactical CA
companies to ARCENT for redeployment to the U. S., beginning on 25 March and
‘ Elliott, Bñef Histoty, passim,
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terminating with the release of the 432nd CA company on 6 April 1991.58 The KiT was
able to revert to its earlier mission, assisting in long-term reconstruction efforts. Task Force
Freedom’s operations were terminated on 30 April 1991, at which time BG Mooney, who
had been named Commander on 15 April, turned over the continued work of reconstruction
to MG Patrick J. Kelly, bead of the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office (DRAO), an
ad hoc body created from Army assets.59 Most of the KF redeployed to CONUS, along
with its parent organization, the 352nd CA Command, arriving in the U. S. on 10 May
1991.60
The KTF, along with the 352nd CA Command, turned in an excellent performance
during the Gulf War. Theft prior planning and subsequent execution bore fruit in that
Coalition forces were relieved of having to devote large amounts of their resources to the
support of the civilian population. The Kuwaiti government contracted for most services,
upon the advice of the KTF, and paid the bills promptly. Supplies delivered during the
emergency included 2.8 million liters of diesel fuel; 1250 tons of medicine; 12.9 million liters
of water; 12,500 metric tons of food; 250 electrical generators; and over 750 vehicles. Thirty
The 432nd and 431st, along with the 418th CA Co. and the 354th CA Bde, were redeployed to Southern
Turkey/Northern Iraq in April to assist in the Kurdish relief effort, designated Operation PROVIDE
COMFORT. They performed magnificently in that role.
Brinkerhoff Waging the War”, pp. 67-68. While the FCF had originilly planned to remain in country for
an extended period, assisting with long-term reconstruction, the availability of the Corps of Engineers with its
vast experience in such matters convinced all concerned that an early hand-off to DRAO was appropriate.
DRAO reported to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Logistics.
Elliott states that the KIT had expected to remain in-country until September or October, 1991.
However, during the first week of June President Bush indicated that he would bring the troops home not later
than July. Redeployment orders were cut almost at once. This was not seen as a problem by Elliott, since the
Corps of Engineers had, by that time, assumed major responsibilities for the reconstruction effort. Elliott had
been a strong proponent of COE involvement from the earliest days. “I knew we would fail if we didn’t get the
Corps involved”, he stated. He indicated that it would not have been possible for a civilian agency to ad as lead
agency during the reconstruction effort, since they would not have been able to operate in a combat zone. (From
a conversation with Colonel Elliott on 2 February 1993.)
6020 members of the 352nd remained behind to assist DR4O until 5 May 199L 5 persons remained with
the 22nd Support Command assisting with Host Nation Support until September, 1991.
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five major convoys were operated, involving 1700 vehicles.61 By the time the KTh and
Task Force Freedom departed, the Ministry of Health had become operational and the
Kuwaiti medical community was carrying 98% of its pre-war workload. The international
airport reopened and the Kuwaitis resumed operational control in April, 1991. Police forces
were operational within the first 30 days following liberation. A major Kuwaiti port was
opened during the first two weeks after liberation, and two others were being swept for
mines. AU major roads had been restored to service, with most able to sustain convoy
trafflcP
The work that the WIT did contributed to an unprecedented CA mission. The
initiative taken to remove the team from the Command and Control of the Army “plowed
new ground” in utilization of this branch for the purposes of national defense. That the
experiment had to be carried out with only grudging cooperation from Headquarters,
Department of the Army, added to the difficulty of reaching ultimate success, but in no way
detracts from the usefulness of the mission.
The work that the KTF and the 352nd CAC performed received high praise from Mr.
James Locher, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict,
and from Mr. Fred Smith, Director for Near East/South Asia, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense of International Security Assistance, among othersP The Secretary
of the Army, Michael P.W. Stone, wrote, “It is not an exaggeration to say that bringing
Kuwait back to life in the early days foIIoing the Iraqi departure would not have been
61 Elliott KTF, p. 9.
o2jj,jj
Interview by the author with Mr. Jim Lecher, ASD SO/LIC, on 18 March 1991. Interview by the author
with Mr. Fred Smith, OASD/ISA, on 24 December 1991.
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possible without the 352nd.M Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney wrote, “Your role
in U. S. Government assistance to the Government of Kuwait in its reconstruction of that
country was exceptional, both for its swiftness and the depth of expertise which you
provided. The extraordinary skills resident only in the Reserve Component were absolutely
essential to these successes.’6
Clearly, the KTF constituted a success story, one of which the CA community can be
proud in the years to come. The work that it performed helped to establish a pattern for
future utilization of military forces in disaster and humanitarian relief efforts.M At the
beginning of DESERT SHIELD, General Schwartzkopf indicated to Major General W. G.
Pagonis that he didn’t want” . . to win the war and lose the peace.”67 The KiT worked
to insure that this did not happen. In great measure, as stated in the motto of the Civil
Affairs Branch, they helped to “secure the victory.”
64 Letter from the Secretary of the Army to MG W.F. Ward, Jr., Chief of the Army Restive, dated 5 April
1991.
Dick Cheney, “Message to the Civil Affairs Symposium” dated October 23, 1991.
Since DESERT SHIELD/STORM and PROVIDE COMFORT (the Kurdish Relief Effort), CA personnel
have been employed in the Bangladesh Typhoon Relief effort; the Haitian “boat people” episode; and the florida
hurricane relief effort US. troops have also been employed in a Civil-Military Operations effort in the former
Soviet Union and in Somalia. A dear trend toward more military involvement in missions of this type is evident.
61 William 0. Pagonis, Movhw Mountains (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), p. 11. GeneraJ
Pagonis mentions the employment of CA personnel at one point in his book, although he makes no mention of
the KITs activities or of the outstanding work performed in the area of Host Nation Support by the 304th CA
Op (RC), the 96th CA Bn (AC) and by the 3rd and 4th CA Gps, USMCR. This may be accounted for by the
fact that the assets of these units were detailed in small cells to various elements of the 22nd SUPCOM, ‘Ahith
provided oveafi loglsties support to the theater. Consequently, the visibility of the CA units was much reduced.
Pagonis does state that - At the height of the Gull conflict, the 22nd Support Command drew a full 70-p (us
percent of its personnel from reserve units; and we’re lucky that we were able to do so. . . . They were fully
confident in theft ability as leaders--and in fact many had been leaders in the private sector--and they accepted
broad responsibilities eagerly.” p. 101.
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AFERNOTh
An operation of this magnitude thaws on the competence and dedication of many
persons. As described in the preceding account, any number of senior to junior persons,
starting with the President of the United States and ending with sergeants and privates in
the various Civil Affairs units, contributed to the miracle that was the Kuwait Task Force.
A number of talented civilians within DOD and OSD lent their talents to the success of the
operation. Within the uniformed community, however, several key participants
demonstrated unusual vision, political acumen1 willingness to place themselves at risk, and
tenacity. First among these is Colonel Randall T. Elliott, the Director of the WIT. Elliot
was the man who, seeing the developing need for assistance of the type ultimately provided,
and sensing that the Departments of Army and Defense were unlikely to call upon the Civil
Affairs community to provide it, “took his career in his hands” and made the contacts with
Ambassador-Designate “Sldp” Gnehm necessary to initiate the process that created the KiT.
As mentioned earlier, Elliott is a rare combination of intellect, assertiveness and drive,
commitment and personal stubbornness. His salesmanship captured the attention of those
who could “make things happen,” and for this the Nation, DoD, and the CA community are
in his debtP
Within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low Intensity Conflict, LTC Paul Mikesh, the Civil Affairs Action officer, served as a key
player throughout the War. Mikesh, an experienced CA Reservist presently sewing on an
Active Guard and Reserve Tour, monitored the day-to-day activities in CA for his office,
68 Regrettabley, Colonel Elliott’s relations within the 352nd CA Command deteriorated to the point that he
felt it appropriate to leave that unit shortly after the redeployment to CONUS. He presently serves as an
Individual Mobilization Augmentee with OASD SO/LIC, in Washington, D.C. He did receive a Bronze Star for
his service in the War.
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acting as an intelligence-gatherer and ‘sleeve-tugger” for BG Charles Wilhelm, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Mission Activities. Mikesh sat through endless meetings, deciphered
the voluminous message traffic, prepared dozens of memoranda and information papers for
BC Wilhelm and Mr. Locher, and interacted constantly with personnel within the Pentagon.
LTC Mikesh is largely responsible for making the policy-makers aware of the need for OSD
and JCS to proactively assume theft roles and for alerting these same decision-makers to
the fact that CA assessments being conducted in Saudi Arabia during Fall, 1990, by the 96th
CA Bn were insufficient and that planning for CA within ARCENT and CENTCOM was
inadequate, at best LTC Mikesh provided the ammunition used by Mr. Locher and BC
Wilhelm in many of the successful battles they fought on behalf of CA and its appropriate
utilization during the Gulf War. He is a gifted writer, a man of strong opinions and
commitment, strong intellect, excellent political understanding and substantial drive. As in
the case of Colonel Elliott, the Nation and the CA community are greatly in his debt.69
LTC Dennis Barlow, then the CA action officer with the PSYOP/Civil Affairs Branch
of the Current Operations Directorate, The Joint Staff, was extraordinarily influential in the
promotion of CA interests during the Gull War. As the only trained CA person on the
Joint Staff, he was the officer chosen to give the initial informational briefing to the
Kuwaitis and, like LTC Mikesh, served on the U. 5.-Kuwait Civil Affairs Working Group.
a subset of the U. S. Steering Group Committee established to implement the assistance
program to the GOK A brilliant thinker and organizational strategist, Barlow is a powerful
speaker and debater and a man of great conviction and integrity. His management of CA
deployment orders within JCS, service on numerous committees responsible for CA-related
decisions, and constant promotion of the interests of Civil Affairs as it supported national
69 LTC M&esh’s continues to serve in ASD SO/LIC, an unsung hero of the Persian Gulf War.
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priorities was flawless, helping to insure the smooth flow of activites in this important
area°
These three men, working closely with theft superiors, were largely responsible for
the success of the KTF mission. Many others, of course, contributed to the process but it
was their dedication and hard work that provided the ‘chemistry’ necessary to carry out this
difficult and unprecedented mission. They demonstrated the ‘power of the lowerarchy,” the
influence that mid-level operatives can have in achieving organizational goals.
LTC Barlow was promoted to Colonel, was decorated, and assumed a position as strategic planner th
OASD SO/UC in late 1991.
p
